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Abstract: We study the strategic investment behaviour of oligopsonistic rivals in the
labour market.  Under wage competition, firms play "puppy dog" with productivity-
augmenting investment and "fat cat" with supply-enhancing investment.  Under
employment competition, investing strategically always involves playing "top dog".
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11. Introduction
Since it was first conceived, the Fudenberg-Tirole "Cats and Dogs" taxonomy of business
strategies (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984) has become the standard framework for
characterising investment behaviour in an oligopolistic set-up.  Ensuing work has
produced interesting applications (Neary and Leahy (2000)) and refinements of the initial
taxonomy (Lapham and Ware (1994), Jun and Vives (2004)).  Common to all of these is
the concern with investment strategies that reinforce a firm's position in the output
market.  Remarkably, the strategic investment behaviour of firms that want to strengthen
their position in the input market has not been formally analysed.  This paper aims to fill
that gap in the literature.
While our analysis applies to input markets in general, we focus on the labour market in
particular.  This choice is a natural one, especially when viewed in light of recent
developments in labour economics.  Convincing arguments have been presented to
defend the belief that the labour market -like many other markets- is essentially
imperfectly competitive, thereby challenging the old paradigm of perfect competition in
the labour market (Manning, 2003).  Proponents of this school of thought argue that the
labour supply curve facing an individual firm is typically not infinitely elastic but upward
sloping, therefore making firms' behaviour monopsonistic or oligopsonistic 1.
In this paper, we present a taxonomy of investment strategies for firms that have
oligopsony power in the labour market and highlight possible implications of labour
market policies on strategic investment.
2. The model
Two firms, i and j, play a two-period game.  In the second period, firms act as
duopsonists in the labour market.  They decide simultaneously, either setting wages (we
call this "wage competition") or employment levels ("employment competition").  For
                                                
1 More specifically, Manning (2003) argues that all that is required for a firm's labour supply curve to be
upward sloping is that a wage cut of one cent does not cause all workers to leave the firm immediately.  He
presents empirical evidence that supports this and explains it by referring to the existence of "local" labour
2conciseness, we solve the model in terms of general "actions" ( jihAh , , = ) and then
discuss the implications for wage ( hh wA = ) and employment competition ( hh LA = ),
respectively.  Firm i faces the labour supply function:
),( jiii wwLL =  (1)
Henceforth, partial derivatives with respect to actions are subscripted, with A, L and w
being suppressed in subscripts where this cannot cause confusion (for instance,
jii
j wLL ¶¶º / ).  A rise in firm i’s wage attracts more labour ( 0>
i
iL ); a fall in its rival’s
wage pushes workers towards firm i ( 0<ijL ).  For simplicity, we assume perfect
competition in the goods market, implying that a firm's product price, hp , is given.
In period one, firm i chooses an investment level, K.  For clarity and simplicity, we
assume only one firm invests (as do Fudenberg and Tirole (1984))2.  First, we consider
the case in which K has a positive effect on the investing firm’s marginal labour
productivity.  We call this form of investment  “productivity-augmenting” (PA).
Alternatively, investment may cause an outward shift in the labour supply curve facing a
firm (examples include job advertising as well as within-firm crèche facilities, a
commuter shuttle service for firm employees, recreational areas surrounding offices –a
nice dining hall, a spacious coffee room, a green zone).  This alternative form of
investment will be labelled as “supply-enhancing” (SE).  In both cases, firms’ profits (p )
are given by expressions (2) and (3):
)(KCLwqp iiiiii --=p (2)
jjjjj Lwqp -=p (3)
Firm output is denoted by hq .  iC  represents firm i's cost of investment, with marginal
cost 0>iKC  and second derivative 0³
i
KKC .
                                                                                                                                                
markets (which occur, for instance, because of a desire to avoid congestion and/or cut commuting time to
meet the demands of family life).
2 Extending the model to allow investment by both firms is straightforward.
3With PA investment, firm i’s output function is given by ),( KLqq iii =  with partial
derivatives 0>i
Li
q , 0£i
LL ii
q  and 0>iKq .  Because investment raises labour productivity,
0>iiKq .  Since we assume that firm j does not invest, its output function simply is
)( jjj Lqq =  with 0>j
L j
q  and 0£j
LL jj
q .  If firms set wages, we use the direct labour
supply function in expression (1).  With employment-setting firms, we use the inverse
labour supply ),( jiii LLww = , with 0>iiw  and 0>
i
jw .
With SE investment we assume that, unlike with PA investment, K does not enter firm i's
production function directly, which allows us to distinguish clearly the effects of each
type of investment; thus, )( iii Lqq = .  Importantly, investment now shifts the labour
supply curve.  Hence, we have ),,( KwwLL jiii = , with 0>iKL , and ),(
jijj wwLL =
when firms choose wages.  When firms set employment levels, ),,( KLLww jiii =  with
0<iKw  and ),(
jijj LLww = .
3.  The investment taxonomy under oligopsony
We now derive optimal investment strategies under oligopsony.  In compact notation, we
have ),,( KAA jiii pp =  and ),( jijj AApp = .  Using backward induction, we first turn
to the second period.  Firm i chooses its profit-maximising action given its rival’s action,
implying
0)( =+-= i
A
ii
A
ii
A
i
i iii wLLwpqp (4)
For brevity, we define i
A
i
L
i
A iii
Lqq º .  Under wage competition, i
w
i
A ii
LL =  and 1=i
Ai
w ,
while 1=i
Ai
L  and i
L
i
A ii
ww =  under employment competition.
Expression (4) determines firm i’s best response function, )( jii AA y= , for a given level
of investment.  Similarly, firm j’s best response function, )( ijj AA y= , is obtained from
0=jjp .  It will prove useful to sign the slope of )(
ij Ay .  Total differentiation of 0=jjp
gives jjj
j
ji
ijij dAdAA ppy //)(' -=º .  Note that 0>jjip  under wage competition,
4assuming that jjiL , if negative, is sufficiently small in absolute value (which is in line
with the normal standard assumption); under employment competition 0<jjip , assuming
that jjiw , if negative, is sufficiently small in absolute value
3.  Thus, since 0<jjjp  from the
second-order conditions, 0)(' >ij Ay  under wage competition and 0)(' <ij Ay  under
employment competition.  Using terminology introduced by Bulow, Geanokopolos and
Klemperer (1985) in the oligopoly literature, wages are strategic complements whereas
employment levels are strategic substitutes.
Turning to period one, firm i maximises profits with respect to K, taking into account the
effect of investment on profits through its rival’s second-period action ( )/( dKdA jijp ):
0=+=
dK
dA
dK
d ji
j
i
K
i
ppp (5)
The second term in expression (5) is the strategic term.  In the absence of strategic
behaviour, firm i would choose K such that 0=iKp .  If, however, the strategic term is
positive or negative, the firm will -relative to the non-strategic benchmark- overinvest
( 0<iKp ) or underinvest ( 0>
i
Kp ), respectively.  Characterising strategic investment
behaviour requires signing the strategic term.  Assuming that the sign of jip  is the same
as the sign of ijp  (see also Tirole (1988), p.326), and since dK
dA
A
dK
dA iij
j
)('y= , we have
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From our earlier discussion, we know the sign of )(' ij Ay .  The other term on the right
hand side in expression (6) comprises of the effect of a firm's action on rival profitability
(the "friendliness" term4), jip , and the effect of investment on the firm's own action,
dKdAi / .  Since ji
jj
L
j
i Lwpq j )( -=p  under wage competition and 
j
i
jj
i wL-=p  under
                                                
3 More specifically, jji
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hh wA =  and )( jji
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L
j
ji wLw i +-=p
when hh LA = .  With linear labour supplies, both jjiL  and 
j
jiw  are zero.
4 This term was first introduced by Brander (1995, p.1415).
5employment competition, actions in oligopsony are always "unfriendly" ( 0<jip ).  An
expression for dKdAi /  is obtained by total differentiation of second-period first-order
conditions with respect to K:
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with stability requirement 0>- iij
j
ji
j
jj
i
ii pppp  and 0<
j
jjp  from the second-order
conditions.
The sign of dKdAi /  is the same as the sign of iiKp  and hinges on the type of investment
considered.  We now discuss the investment taxonomy for PA and SE investment,
respectively.
3.1. Productivity-augmenting investment
Under PA investment, 0>= i
KA
ii
iK iqpp  since 0>
i
KAi
q .  Hence, 0/ >dKdAi  both under
wage and employment competition.  This, combined with the fact that actions are
"unfriendly", implies that PA investment always makes the investing firm "tough"
( 0<
dK
dA ij
ip ).  When firms set wages -bearing in mind that 0)(' >
ij Ay -, the strategic
term is negative ( 0<
dK
dA ji
jp ).  Therefore, 0>
i
Kp  (from expression (5)), which indicates
that strategic behaviour involves underinvestment.  In the Fudenberg-Tirole (1984)
terminology, the firm plays "puppy dog" under wage competition, that is, it chooses to be
small and inoffensive.    Intuitively, because the investing firm knows a high rival wage
reduces its own profits, it wants to suppress it.  Given the strategic complementarity
between wages, this necessitates a commitment by firm i to a low wage (relative to the
non-strategic benchmark).  Underinvestment ensures a low future wage since it keeps a
firm's labour productivity low.
Figure 1 shows second-period reaction functions when firms set wages.  N denotes the
equilibrium when firms invest non-strategically.  Firms i's profits increase as jw
6decreases.  Strategic investment shifts firm i's reaction function to the left, resulting in the
equilibrium denoted by S.  At ),( jSiS ww , wages are lower than in the non-strategic
benchmark.
Note that, under employment competition, the strategic term is positive ( 0>
dK
dA ji
jp )
because PA investment makes the investing firm "tough" ( 0<
dK
dA ij
ip ) and the rival's
best response function is negatively sloped ( 0)(' <ij Ay ).  Hence, 0<iKp  and firm i
plays "top dog", or, overinvests, thereby reducing rival employment, to look big and
aggressive.
3.2. Supply-enhancing investment
Our discussion now turns to strategic behaviour under SE investment.  Under wage
competition, 0)()1( <-+-= iiK
ii
L
ii
K
i
i
i
LL
ii
iK LwqpLLqp iiip  (assuming 
i
iKL  is not too
positive) and hence 0/ <dKdAi , implying that SE investment makes the investing firm
"soft".  Strategic investment thus involves adopting a "fat cat" attitude: overinvest to look
big and inoffensive.  SE investment shifts down the labour supply curve facing the firm,
lowering the reservation wage as non-wage benefits to workers increase.  Apart from
lowering the firm's own wage, this also reduces the rival's wage.  Finally, under
employment competition, 0)( >+-= iiK
ii
K
i
iK wLwp  (assuming 
i
iKw  is not too positive) and
hence 0/ >dKdAi .  So, like with PA investment, a strategically investing firm adopts a
"top dog" stance under employment competition.
Table 1 summarises our discussion of strategic investment behaviour under oligopsony5.
4. Concluding remarks
                                                
5 Strategic investment to deter firm entry in the labour market seems less plausible.  It is, however,
straightforward to expand the taxonomy to incorporate this case.
7It is worthwhile pointing out that existing labour market policies may have implications
for strategic investment behaviour.  We focus on the effects of a minimum wage, w, using
figure 1 in our explanation.  Assume w > ),min( jSiS ww  (in figure 1, w > wiS).  At w,
firms' reaction functions exhibit a kink.  Firm i's incentive for strategic behaviour is now
mitigated as its own wage (and indeed the rival’s wage) cannot be pushed below w.  In
figure 1, firm i shifts its reaction function only to point M.  In the case of PA investment,
firm i -although still underinvesting- now invests more than in the case without the
minimum wage.  With SE investment, firm i overinvests less, which implies that workers
-although paid more- receive fewer non-wage benefits on the job.
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Table 1: The Fudenberg-Tirole taxonomy for oligopsony
Wage Employment
PA
Investment
Underinvest
 [ 0)/( <dKdAijip  and 0)(' >
ij Ay ]
"PUPPY DOG"
Overinvest
[ 0)/( <dKdAijip  and 0)(' <
ij Ay ]
"TOP DOG"
SE
Investment
Overinvest
[ 0)/( >dKdAijip  and 0)(' >
ij Ay ]
"FAT CAT"
Overinvest
[ 0)/( <dKdAijip and 0)(' <
ij Ay ]
"TOP DOG"
iw
jw
);( Nji Kwy
)( ij wy
Figure 1: Strategic investment in a wage-setting oligopsony
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Note: KN and KS denote the non-strategically and strategically chosen
          level of K, respectively.
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